Introduction
The last few years have witnessed a tremendous proliferation of various forms of electronic transactions. Forecasters predict that by the year 2003, the number of U.S. households that shop on line will be on the order of 40 million or higher, compared to fewer than 10 million in 1998.
Although the majority of electronic transactions are based on posted-prices, auctions have become a popular means of selling commodities on the Internet. Lucking-Reiley (2000) reports that about $80 million worth of goods are sold in Internet auctions each month in 1998, and this figure has grown rapidly.
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The spectrum of goods sold at these auctions has increased considerably, and includes computers and electronics (new and refurbished), collectibles, toys, trading cards, books, music, and many other items. Large merchandisers, like Amazon.com and the Home Shopping Network, have opened their own auction sites where a broad range of consumer products is offered every day.
Internet auction sites can be classified in three groups: business-to-business (B2B), business-to-consumer (B2C), and consumer-to-consumer (C2C). Though B2B auction sites may have the most sophisticated bidders, they are not addressed here due to inaccessibility of auction data for non-registered users. In B2C auction sites, or merchant sites (e.g., uBid, Egghead), the items offered come directly from manufacturers. Here, the auction site plays the role that a retailer would play. Typically, these sites offer more than one unit of the same item for sale in a single auction. In contrast, C2C sites, or listing sites (e.g., eBay, Yahoo! Auctions, Amazon.com Auctions), facilitate person-to-person transactions by creating virtual marketplaces where private bidders and sellers can get together. Most auctions in listing sites are for single items.
A popular format in all of the merchant sites is the "Yankee Auction." 2 This format is a variation of the multi-unit ascending (or "progressive") auction described by Vickrey (1962) ,
and Ortega-Reichert (1968) . The features of this auction are: (a) there are several identical units for sale; (b) each bidder may purchase more than one unit, but all units must be demanded at the Each auction specifies minimum starting bids and bid increments.
An important feature of Yankee-type auctions, and most other Internet auctions, is that the cost of participating is different from its counterpart in live auctions. In live auctions, there may be a fixed cost of attending (opportunity cost plus possible entry fees), but once you are at the auction the cost of entering each bid is zero. Thus, in a live ascending auction with private values, 5 bidders have a dominant strategy of "ratchet" bidding, i.e., outbidding rivals by the minimum possible increment until the price reaches one's value. On the other hand, Internet auctions take place over a relatively long period of time. Thus, it would be difficult for bidders to costlessly monitor the entire bidding progression to enter ratchet-type bids in any given auction. Furthermore, bidders are likely to incur a cost every time they enter a bid in an Internet auction. This is because (a) there is an Internet connection cost, and (b) there is an opportunity cost associated with logging on to the site, filling out the bidding form (and confirming it), and 3 This is typically at least 24 hours. Some sites have soft deadlines and apply an activity rule after the posted end of the auction. This rule usually states that the auction will be closed after five or ten minutes have gone by since the last bid was made. 4 This means that if two bidders enter the same bid price, the one that bids for more units ranks higher. If both bidders bid for the same number of units, the one that placed the earliest first bid ranks higher.
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A private value is one that is idiosyncratic to each bidder. For modeling purposes, each bidder is assumed to know her value but faces uncertainty about other bidders ' values. 4 preparing and entering the bid itself. 6 Most of the auction sites spare bidders some monitoring costs by sending e-mail notices whenever a bidder has been displaced from the set of current winners. In addition, some sites (e.g., eBay and Yahoo! Auctions) allow bidders to reveal the highest price they are willing to pay to a "proxy" bidder, a program that will play the ratchet strategy on behalf of the bidder.
In this paper we develop a simple model that shows that the presence of bidding costs may induce bidders to move away from ratchet strategies in Yankee-type auctions. We then derive conditions under which bidders enter jump bids (bid increments that are larger than the minimum) in an equilibrium of the model. Both authors have experienced these costs on many occasions. Depending on site congestion and connection speed, it may take as long as 15 minutes to complete the process of logging-on, signing-in, and entering and confirming a single bid. Hereafter, the terms signaling bid and jump bid are used interchangeably.
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The source of the bidding costs in D&H's model is mainly related to preparing and announcing the bid. However, their formulation is general enough to accommodate other sources as well. The remaining 216 jump bidders are divided between 4.6% (170) who jump twice, and 1.2% (46) who jump more than twice.
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A number of recent papers have studied bidding at eBay, the major listing site for C2C
auctions.
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However, because of the automatic bidding enforced for all bidders at eBay, none of these studies is able to examine jump-bidding behavior. We present our costly bidding model in Section 2, our data in Section 3, the empirical analysis in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
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Although we do not know how Avery's model behaves in the presence of costly bidding.
11
69 % of bidders in the sample bid in only one auction in the sample. An additional 15% bid in two auctions, and 99% of bidders bid in 8 or fewer auctions in the sample.
12 Bajari and Hortaçsu (2000) , find that costly entry is important to understanding bidding behavior in these auctions. Lucking-Reiley et.al. (2000) find that seller reputation, minimum bids, and auction duration all affect prices in significant ways. Roth and Ockenfels (2000) study the strategic issues associated with "last minute" bidding at both eBay and Amazon.com auctions. Finally, Wilcox (2000) finds that experienced bidders behave in ways that are more consistent with traditional auction theory.
Model
There are two identical risk-neutral bidders who will potentially compete to buy one unit at a Yankee-type auction.
13
The seller's reservation price or minimum bid for this unit is b, and each bidder holds a non-negative private valuation for the unit denoted v i (i=1,2). Both bidders draw their valuation independently from the distribution f(⋅) with support [v, v< ] , where v< > b.
There is demand uncertainty in the following sense: The first (or "early") bidder arrives to the auction site for sure, but an exogenous and commonly known two-point distribution determines whether or not a second (or "late") bidder will find the auction. The probability of the second bidder not finding the auction is q, while she finds it with probability (1-q).
14 If the second bidder finds the auction she endogenously decides whether to enter a bid or not based on the current information available at the auction site, which includes the first bidder's bid. We assume that bidder arrival is predetermined, and that each bidder knows their order of arrival.
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We call the bidder who arrives first bidder 1 (B1), and the bidder who potentially arrives second bidder 2 (B2). The value of each bidder's current high bid is denoted b i (i=1,2), and the highest bidder at the end of the auction will take the object. Because bidders draw their valuations from a continuous distribution, ties occur with probability zero.
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This is the simplest setup we found to obtain interesting predictions for this type of auction. A model with three bidders and two units yields qualitatively comparable predictions.
14 For a general formulation of an auction model with a stochastic number of bidders, see McAfee and McMillan (1987) .
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This could be rationalized by having the first bidder arrive on the first half of the auction and the second bidder -potentially -arrive on the second half of the auction.
Every time a bidder connects to the site and places a bid, she incurs a cost c≥0. This cost, which we may interpret as an opportunity cost of time and/or connection cost, is common to both bidders, and does not change as the auction progresses.
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Bidders are free to revise their bids as many times as they want, consistent with a "soft" bidding deadline in an Internet auction.
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Our model could be interpreted as a variation of D&H, in which the demand uncertainty creates an asymmetry in the distributions from which the bidders draw their private valuations.
In fact, we could simply view B2 as drawing a valuation equal to v with probability q, and equal to v 2 with probability 1-q. Since D&H's model accommodates asymmetric bidders, with the appropriate modifications, most of their basic results will apply to our model as well.
D&H consider a possible preamble to the actual bidding by allowing bidders to "pass" if it is not ex ante profitable for them to participate given the available information. If a passing bidder then observes her opponent passing as well, she will use that information to update her prior beliefs about the opponent's value, reevaluate her expected profitability from participating, and potentially enter a bid later in the auction. However, in the D&H model, the bidding cost is a pure transaction cost, and thus can be avoided if a bidder chooses to pass. Instead, our cost is associated both with connecting and gathering information at the site, as well as going through 16 Technically, it is possible that a bidder's first bidding cost may differ from bidding costs incurred later in the auction. This is because there may be a cost associated with browsing and finding an auction prior to placing the first bid, which would cause part of the initial bidding cost to be sunk and thus not play any role in the decision. As long as the cost sequence is known, indexing costs by a bidder's bid count (i.e., c 1 , c 2 ,…) would be a trivial extension of our model.
In practice, this is an activity-based rule. Typically, after the posted close of the auction, bidding remains open as long as there has been a bid placed within the last five -ten minutes. the bidding process itself. As such, passing is costly, and a preamble where bidders repeatedly reconnect (and accumulate costs) prior to bidding, is highly implausible and would result in wasteful outcomes. Thus, we simply assume that if a potential bidder does not find it profitable to enter a bid at the outset, he simply walks away from the auction and attains some non-negative and exogenous reservation utility denoted u o .
18
The bidding process is illustrated in Figure 1 .
( Figure 1 about here) 
Ratchet Solution
As shown in many previous studies, if bidding costs are negligible, i.e., c=0, the auction we just described is an ordinary progressive auction (Vickrey 1961 ). In our model, if only the first bidder enters the auction, she will take the unit at the minimum price b. Alternatively, if both bidders enter, bidding will progress until the price reaches the valuation of the lowest-valuing bidder. In any case, since each bidder's strategy depends only on her valuation, it is dominant for each bidder to start at the minimum feasible bid and continue to bid up to the point where the price reaches her own valuation.
Jump-Bidding Solution
If bidders incur a positive cost each time they bid, it may no longer be optimal for them to use the ratchet strategy. Take for instance B1. Upon arriving at the auction site, he first faces the choice of participating or not. If he decides to participate, he then must choose to (a) enter a ratchet bid and possibly have to bid again later, or (b) enter a jump bid with the goal of signaling his valuation and deterring potential future competition. (ii) If v 1 <v*, B1 refrains from bidding, and should B2 find the auction, she bids b if v 2 -(b+c)≥u o , and refrains from bidding otherwise.
(iii) If B2 finds the auction, v 1 <v*, and v 2 <b+c+u o , the object is not sold.
(iv) If B2 finds the auction, v 1 <v*, and v 2 >b+c+u o , the object is sold to B2.
(v) If B2 finds the auction and {v 1 , v 2 }>v*, the object is sold to the highest valuing bidder.
If B2 does not find the auction, and v 1 <v* the object is not sold; otherwise it is sold to B1.
PROOF: Follows from Proposition 3 of Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) with two modifications: (I) B2's valuation equals v with probability q and is distributed according to f(•) with probability 1-q, and (II) Each bidder's alternative to entering an initial bid is to walk away and receive nonnegative reservation utility equal to u o . See Appendix A for details. #
The expression in (1) is the standard equilibrium bid function for a single-unit sealed-bid auction, but adjusted for two factors: demand uncertainty and costly bidding. When B1 places a signaling bid, a positive and a negative effect are induced. On the plus side, a subset of B2 types (those with valuations lower than the signaled v 1 ) will be deterred from placing a bid at all, thus eliminating the need to bid again and minimizing B1's expected bidding costs. On the down side, a jump bid necessarily implies that, should B1 be the eventual winner, he will leave some money on the table, regardless of whether his bid had a deterrent effect or not.
20
In fact, a very interesting feature of our auction is that, adjusting for the bidding cost and demand uncertainty, B1 places the same exact bid he would place in a first price auction, while B2 places the same exact bid she would place in an English auction.
The proposition implies that, for any positive cost, the positive effect outweighs the negative effect for all those B1 types choosing to participate.
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Intuitively, this arises from the fact that if B1 wins with a signaling bid, on average, he will pay the same price he would pay should he win in an English auction. However, while he pays the bidding cost once in the signaling equilibrium, he does it more than once if he uses a ratchet strategy. 22
Predictions
Based on our simple theoretical model, we extract the following testable predictions:
(a) A bidder is more likely to jump bid (enter a higher jump bid) as he anticipates more competition in the auction.
This follows from:
In intuitive terms, as the probability of no further entry increases, the level of the signaling bid required to deter more competitors decreases, because there will be more B2 types with effective valuations equal to zero. In the limit, as the probability of no further entry approaches one, the probability of entering a jump bid nears zero (i.e., b 1 | q=0 =b). This prediction extends naturally to cases with more than two bidders. This is because having more bidders increases the potential pool of signal recipients, and as such also the value of jump-bidding. Since signaling 21
Thus, although the down side of jump-bidding is potentially larger in our model (because of demand uncertainty), D&H's claim that very small costs may result in large jumps, extends to the similar auction we study here.
22
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this insight.
bids are targeted to bidders that would be just excluded from the set of winners, by properties of order statistics, more bidders induce a higher equilibrium value of the signaling bid.
(b) The size of the jump is inversely related to the minimum starting bid.
Because all jumps are measured relative to the minimum bid, higher minimum starting bids will truncate the distribution of jump bids from below. In terms of the model: (4) (c) A bidder who jumps on the first bid is more likely to place fewer bids than one who does not.
In the model, for any c>0, any B1 that chooses to participate will enter a jump bid, and that would be his only bid as long as B2 adheres to her best response strategy. If B1 finds it optimal to enter a ratchet bid (perhaps because c=0), depending on B2's response, he may have to enter yet more bids later in the auction.
(d) An auction with larger early jump bids will have fewer bids placed overall.
If B1's signaled valuation effectively deters B2 from participating, then B1's bid would be the only bid placed in the auction. Thus, a stronger bidder would enter a higher jump bid, and deter a larger number of subsequent bidder types from entering the auction. In terms of the model, this follows from monotonicity of the equilibrium bid function, and from the fact that all B2 types whose valuations are lower than the signaled v 1 are deterred from bidding.
bidder that bids early in the auction is more likely to enter a jump bid (enter a larger jump bid) than a bidder bidding later in the auction.
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In the model, all B1's choosing to participate enter jump bids, whereas the B2 types that are not deterred by B1's jump bid are able to just preempt further bids from B1. Thus, statistically, later bids are more likely to appear as ratchet or small jump bids, rather than large jump bids
Data
We recorded data from multi-item auctions at two different Internet auction sites, Onsale.com and uBid.com, using a computer program that ran continuously. The two auction sites specialize to a large extent in consumer electronic and computer products, and offered both new and refurbished items, usually with the item's manufacturer as the seller. Since the items were auctioned for original manufacturers or distributors, and not for individuals, any effect of uncertainty about delivery and warranty on prices should be minimized. In general, any gaps in recording resulted from interruption of the Internet connection or related technical problems.
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The low correlation of minimum bid and list price is due to the concentration of list price data in uBid auctions, where minimum bids are generally fixed at $7.
$20, are also positively correlated with average winning bid (corr=0.33), and list price (corr=0.48).
( Table 1 about We define this as the average of winning bids at the lowest winning bid plus those one increment above the lowest, due to application of the time-of-first-bid rule, which is discussed further in section 4.1.
Empirical Analysis
We perform a series of logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to test our predictions, over the appropriate data sets for each. All results reported in section 4.2 below are for the subset of auction data (159 auctions, 8631 bids, 8015 bidders) for which we have an exogenous item value measure -the list price -available as a control variable. The results over the full data set are generally consistent with the results reported, with differences noted as appropriate. We describe the dependent, independent and control variables used in these analyses in the following section, and report results for the subset of data with the exogenous item value measure in the subsequent section.
Definition of Variables
We use two different dependent variables to test two interpretations of predictions (a), (b) and (e). The first is a binary dependent variable that flags whether a bid is a jump bid, and the second measures the magnitude of the bid gap.
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The magnitude of the bid gap is simply the number of bid increments by which a new bid exceeds the minimum posted winning bid at the time of the bid. This value could be 0 if the number of bidders is less than the number of items at the time the bid is placed, or if the time-of-first-bid rule breaks a tie in favor of the new bid.
Typical rules for a Yankee-type auction will break a tie by favoring the bidder who placed her first bid earliest, so in some cases a tying bid will win. The logistic dependent variable is related to the magnitude of the bid gap in this way: it is 0 (not a jump) if the magnitude of the bid gap is 0 or 1, and it is 1 (a jump bid) if the magnitude is greater than 1. In other words, we ignore the 27 It is perhaps more natural to speak of the magnitude of the bid increment or of the jump bid, but both of these variables are used in other ways in this paper. So to avoid confusion we refer to the bid gap as the amount by which a new bid exceeds the minimum currently winning bid.
time-of-first-bid tie-breaking rule in assessing jump bids, and consider a bid gap of magnitude 1 to be a ratchet bid.
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This will undercount jump bids slightly, but given that 85% (11120 of 13080) of bids in the full sample are first bids (where time-of-first-bid rules could not favor the new bid), this makes little difference to the analysis, with any resulting bias providing a more conservative measure of jump bidding.
To test prediction (c), we again use two dependent variables, in this case they are simply the total number of bids per bidder, and a binary version of this variable indicating simply whether the bidder entered more than one bid. We run this analysis on the 8631 bidders who place bids in the subset of recorded auctions with list price data available. Finally, unlike the previous cases, we test prediction (d) at the auction level, with the total number of bids placed per auction as the dependent variable.
All auctions in the sample were 24 hours or longer, and the data include the exact time each bid is placed. The average auction duration in the sample, measuring from first recorded bid to last recorded bid, was 23.5 hours, with a variance of 2.5 hours. The variance was due both to time passing prior to the first recorded bid, and extension of the bidding past the posted close due to activity-based closing rules. Auctions in the sample ended between 0 and 147 minutes past the posted closing time, with an average extension of 23 minutes. We ignore the time-of-first-bid tie-breaking rule, which could affect a small percentage of bids in the sample, because it seems likely that many bidders ignore it. Neither auction site in the study uses this rule in posting a minimum bid needed to win. Instead, uBid posts a single value that ignores the time-based rule as well as the quantity-based rule, and Onsale posts the range of currently winning bids. We do not consider bid quantity in defining jump bids.
one third of bids occur during the first six hours of an auction, one fourth during the last 90 minutes, and most remaining bids early on the closing day rather than the night before. To control for variance in auction duration, the independent variable, Percent Time of Bid, is the time the bid is placed expressed as a percentage of elapsed auction time, with a value of 0 indicating the first bid and 100 the last.
( Table 2 about here)
The independent variable Number of Bidders is the number of bidders who enter bids in the auction. This value is unknown to bidders during the auction, except approximately or in expectation, and with decreasing uncertainty as the auction progresses. We are not able to capture the act of a potential bidder examining posted currently winning bids, and then declining to bid. Though this would clearly be useful in establishing bid deterrence, this data would only be available to the site running the auction, and then only if they chose to record it.
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The auctions often attracted bidders interested in a large number of units, who were often judged to be dealers by other bidders, based on posted optional comments attached to their bids.
Frequently, these bidders would appear early in an auction, and then disappear as bid levels increased. In order to control for any distortion the presence of such bidders might produce,
Since we use actual number of bidders as a proxy for expected number of bidders, the coefficient for this variable may be biased upwards. This is because the actual number of bidders is a subset of the set of potential bidders (i.e., those who are not deterred).
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There are some possible distortions. First, the presence of multi-unit demand bidders may introduce asymmetries into the bidding contest. Second, if these bidders are dealers, their values may be more likely to have a common element. Finally, since these bidders' have positive we label an auction in which any bid is placed for more than two units as having "dealer presence." The decision to mark bids for three or more items as dealer bids is based on the distribution of maximum quantities requested per auction, shown in To control for item value we performed the analysis over the subset of auctions for which we have posted list price information, as described in the previous section. We also used the average of all winning bids to control for item value in the analysis over the whole data set.
Since the average winning bid is not fully exogenous, we performed the latter analysis mainly as a robustness test. In fact, both the list price and average winning bid are strongly correlated. In the sub-sample of 8631 bids entered in 159 auctions with list price information, the correlation coefficient between these two variables is approximately 0.9. Both list price and average winning bid are expressed in bid increments.
The remaining control variables are Units Available and Minimum Bid in Increments.
The former is simply the number of units available in the auction. This is classified as low (2-5 copies of the item), medium (6-11) or high (12-61), and enters the analysis as a series of dummy valuations for several units, demand-reduction strategies may be admissible (see Ausubel and Cramton 1998, Tenorio 1997) .
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Dealers are about 5% more likely, on average, to place their first bid as a jump bid (33.3%, versus 31.7% for other bidders). Dealer bids overall are about 1% more likely to be jump bids.
variables for the medium and high state (a continuous version of this variable yields similar results). The latter is the posted minimum (starting) bid, expressed in bid increments to maintain consistency with the normalization of the two item-value measures discussed above. Bid increment itself is not included as a control variable because it is used to normalize three other variables, and also plays a significant role in defining the two dependent measures. Table 4 presents the results of two regression analyses, testing slightly different interpretations of the first two predictions. Prediction (a) concerns the effect of anticipated level of competition on both the probability of jump bidding and on the size of the jump bid. The coefficients for Number of Bidders in Table 4 are positive and significant for both regressions. The logistic regression results suggest that the marginal effect of increasing the number of bidders drives the probability of jump bidding up from 31% with just 3 bidders, to 42% with 253 bidders. The OLS regression results are consistent with these results, showing the magnitude of bid gap increasing in the number of bidders. As noted earlier, the number of bidders, as we measure it, is not known to all bidders during the auction, though bidders appear to be able to form reasonable predictions of this value. Notably, we observe that in all auctions (8 of 236) where the number of bidders is ex post lower than the number of units available, jump bidding does not occur at all.
Results
( Table 4 about here)
Prediction (b) suggests that a higher minimum bid should result in smaller jump bids. This is supported by the results, which show a significant and negative marginal effect of increasing minimum bids on both the probability and size of jump bids. This is the only result reported that differs over the full data set, where the coefficient remains negative, but is no longer statistically significant. It is reasonable though to suspect that controlling for list price, which is not possible for the full data set, is important in gauging the effect of the minimum bid.
Prediction (e) represents somewhat of a useful alternative to prediction (a), since it addresses two potential concerns: first that the number of bidders is itself affected by the presence of jump bids, and second that the number of bidders is an imperfect measure of the anticipated competition in an auction, since it is measured ex post and is not known to the bidder at the time a bid is placed (though that uncertainty decreases as the end of the auction approaches). An alternative is to interpret the amount of time remaining in the auction as a proxy for the expected level of competition. Under this interpretation, we omit Number of Bidders as an independent variable, since we simply assume that the level of competition declines as the auction progresses. Table 5 presents the same analysis that is conducted in Table   4 but omitting Number of Bidders. In both tables, in both regressions, the coefficient for Percent Time of Bid is negative and statistically significant. The logistic regression results imply that the marginal effect of moving from the beginning to the end of the auction drives the probability of entering a jump bid down from 31% to 8%. The OLS regression results indicate that as time passes, the expected magnitude of the bid gap registered with a new bid will decrease, consistent with the reduced probability of entering a jump bid.
(Table 5 about here)
In general the results in Tables 4 and 5 are quite consistent. For example, the effect of the minimum bid is negative and significant in both cases. The largest exception to this is that the Units Available dummy variable coefficients, though positive in both tables, vary in statistical significance. In both cases the coefficients for List Price are positive and significant,
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Note that this holds as well conditional on a jump bid being observed. (See Appendix B).
indicating that both the magnitude of the bid gap, and the probability of entering a jump bid, increase with item value. This is not surprising for a number of reasons, the simplest being that a jump bid is more easily detected -and therefore signaling is more effective -with higher-valued items. Bid increments are not observed to be larger than $20, thus a jump bid is also less likely to round to a single bid increment with higher-valued items. The Dealer Presence variable is never significant across any of our analyses, indicating that bids for large quantities, while eliciting occasional anti-dealer comments, do not appear to affect jump-bidding behavior.
Although the data support the basic predictions concerning the incentives for jumpbidding, the question remains whether jump-bidding has the desired effect when it is employed.
First, does a bidder who places a jump bid actually reduce the cost of bidding by placing fewer bids? Table 6 presents the results of analysis over the set of all bidders who participated in auctions for which we have list price information. The dependent variables here are a flag indicating whether the bidder placed more than one bid, and the number of bids placed by an individual bidder. We also introduce a new independent dummy variable indicating whether that bidder jumped on her first bid or not. The coefficients in both regressions for the Jump on First Bid variable are statistically significant and negative. This implies that the marginal effect of jumping on the first bid leads to a reduced total number of bids placed, and to a reduced probability of bidding more than once, thus supporting prediction (c).
( Table 6 about here) Prediction (d) makes a related point for auctions rather than bidders. If signaling bids are effective, then larger signaling bids early in an auction should lead to fewer overall bids. In the analysis presented in Table 7 , we regress the total number of bids at an auction on the average magnitude of jump bids as measured over the first 10% of elapsed auction time, 33 for the list price data subset. Since the average magnitude of jump bids may be related to the list price of the item, we include this cross-term as well, and find that it does not have statistical significance.
The results indicate that stronger signaling bids early in the auction do lead to a lower number of bids for the entire auction. Together, these results provide indirect evidence of bid deterrence.
( Table 7 about here)
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have presented simple theoretical arguments to explain why bidders may choose to follow jump-bidding strategies in auctions with bidding costs. Using an uncertain demand extension of a model by Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) we show that jump bids may play a signaling role in auctions where it is costly for bidders to place their bids. Our model shows that any positive bidding cost leads to jump bids by bidders choosing to enter, especially early in the auction, and that the extent of this jump-bidding goes up as expected competition increases.
We have also presented extensive evidence from a sample of Internet Yankee-type auctions that supports these theoretical predictions. Our analysis shows that a very large fraction of bidders at these auctions enter jump bids and that these bids are mostly entered early in the auction, when they have greater strategic value. We also show that jump-bidding is more likely in auctions where bidder competition is more intense. Finally we provide evidence that jumpbidding strategies, when used, do lower the number of bids, both at the auction level, and for an individual bidder, consistent with a deterrence effect of jump bids.
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The same analysis with average magnitude of jump bids measured over the first 25% of elapsed auction time yields nearly identical results.
There are a number of interesting questions that remain open, both on the bidder and seller side of auctions with costly bidding. For instance, on the bidder side we assumed that bidders arrive to the auction site on a predetermined basis. As such, timing is not part of the bidding strategy. Yet, one may argue that a strategy of waiting to bid until the final minutes of the auction may be advantageous.
34
A formal analysis of this claim would probably require an asymmetric model, where higher-cost bidders self-select to bid earlier in the auction and are more likely to enter jump bids. Conversely, bidders with lower costs could afford to keep track of the bidding more closely and be active at the specific times of the day when the auctions are set to end. The down side of these timing strategies would be that if the site is very congested at the end of an auction, one may miss the chance to bid altogether. Other extensions may include more bidders or items, richer structures of uncertainty and valuations, and multi-unit demands.
There are many issues that remain unexplored on the seller side as well. For instance, D&H show that seller expected revenue in auctions with costly bidding is smaller than its costless counterpart by a factor related to the expected bidding costs. As such, it is in the seller's best interest to undertake actions that will reduce the cost of bidding. It seems that real-life
Internet auctioneers are aware of this phenomenon. We have found that sellers have introduced two practices that reduce bidding costs: automatic or "proxy" bidding, and "quick" auctions.
With proxy bidding, 35 bidders may privately provide their maximum possible bid (reservation price) to a secure computer program, which will update their current high bid to the minimum necessary for that bidder to be included in the set of winners. In other words, this 34 In fact a large amount of bidding activity is usually observed during the closing minutes of each auction, as seen in Table 2 , and as documented by Roth & Ockenfels (2000) .
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Also known as "bid agents", 'bid-makers", "bid elves", or "bid butlers." mechanism seeks to turn these auctions into Vickrey-like auctions and eliminate the potential costs a bidder will incur when revising her bid. A curious phenomenon is that although many auction sites offer this service as an option, not all bidders choose to use it. It may be that bidders do not trust the privacy of the interaction or the reliability of the computer program, or perhaps they would like to retain the flexibility to revise their reservation price if value correlation exists. An additional complication introduced by proxy bidding is the introduction of heterogeneity. How should non-proxy bidders bid against proxy bidders? Is jump bidding more or less likely in these cases? These are interesting questions for future research.
The second bid-cost reducing seller practice is "quick auctions," also known as "flash auctions" or "express auctions." These are auctions where all of the bidding takes place within a short time period, usually a half-hour or an hour, so they have a bidding cost structure more similar to live auctions, with a higher fixed cost of attending, and a lower per bid cost.
Presumably, what auctioneers intend to do with these auctions is to attract bidders with a low opportunity cost for their time, i.e., bidders that can afford to be in front of their computers for the duration of the auction. Our preliminary analysis of a sample of these auctions reveals that no meaningful jump bidding occurs in them, i.e., they are more like live auctions. Although it is clear that low-cost bidders should be typically attracted to these auctions, the net effect over the auctioneer's revenue would ultimately depend on whether these bidders hold some other special characteristics that could affect the revenue in a well-defined way. For instance, are these bidders more likely to have lower values than the rest of the bidder population? If so, quick auction revenues could actually be negatively affected by bidder selectivity. We intend to examine this as well as other related issues in future projects.
Appendix A: Outline of Proof of Proposition
Since our model is a variation of Daniel and Hirschleifer (1998) , we will just outline the main steps involved in proving the proposition, and refer the reader to their original proof for details.
-Points (ii) to (vi) specify (a) that only bidders who potentially receive a non-negative expected surplus from participating in the auction enter bids. These are al B1's holding valuations at least equal to v* and all B2's holding valuations at least equal to b+c+u o , and (b) the allocation of the object depending on both bidders' possible valuation ranges. The only noteworthy difference relative to D&H arises in point (iv) when v*>v 1 >v 2 and v 2 >b+c+u o . Here, B1 does not participate, B2 participates, and the object is inefficiently assigned to B2.
-Point (i) specifies optimal behavior for both bidders. For any c>0 and u o ≥0, there will be a nonempty range of B1 values that would not find it ex ante profitable to bid. To establish this range, note that the weakest possible B1 to participate can enter a bid equal to b, and that he would be indifferent between doing so and walking away from the auction and receiving u o . This establishes condition (2).
To establish condition (1), notice that given B2's optimal response, B1's bidding problem is:
where ν(•) is the inverse of B1's equilibrium bid function. The above problem is equivalent to a bidder's problem in a first price sealed bid auction. Thus, solving the above problem and noting that the lowest-valuing B1 to enter a bid is v*, i.e., b 1 (v*)=b, results in equation (1). Table A1 shows that, even "conditional" on a jump bid, the magnitude of the jump bid is decreasing over the course of the auction, whether or not the Number of Bidders is included as an explanatory variable.
Appendix B: Further Tests
( Table A1 about here) B2 finds auction with probability 1-q B2 misses auction with probability q For uBid, the highest Minimum Bid was 99, with a mean of 9, for Onsale the lowest was 9, with a mean of 137. 95% of auction closings occurred between noon and 9 p.m. PST, so the 10-hour cutoff tends to fall during nighttime and morning hours, a bit later in the East. 
